On Our Border Conflict, Colonialism, and Historical Misunderstanding: Indonesia–China 70th Year of Bilateral Relations

Christopher Reinhart
8 min readJun 18, 2020
Ceremonie in China (A Ceremony in China) by Carel Christian Antony Last (1837) | Collection of the Rijksmuseum, The Netherlands

Celebrating blindly our — Indonesian — seventy years of diplomatic relations with China without improving our understanding of history is an act of ignorance. Today, most of the Chinese-related matters are stigmatised as negative by the Indonesian public. In January 2020, The Indonesian Survey Institution (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI) presented a survey demonstrating the Indonesian public opinion towards China. In this survey, the Indonesian public considered China as a more influential figure than the United States of America (USA), but in a negative spectrum (LSI 2020). Such a negative perception toward the Chinese — both in China and the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia — and the China state is not a new trend in Indonesia. Throughout history, Indonesia had suffered this kind of anti-Chinese phenomenon. A prominent ethnic-Chinese Indonesian historian, Onghokham (1933–2007), provided an overview of the origin of the anti-Chinese phenomenon in the premodern to the colonial period in his book Anti Cina, Kapitalisme Cina, dan Gerakan Cina: Sejarah Etnis Cina di Indonesia (2008). According to Ong, one of the main reasons leading Indonesians to develop negative stereotypes against the Chinese people was due to their [Chinese] capitalist tendency. The capitalism that the Chinese had built within the Javanese agrarian society had created an economic imbalance.

The effect of Chinese capitalism in Java (both by the peranakan and totok) during the early modern period until the establishment of Dutch colonial rule was in accordance with anthropologist James Scott’s theory. The emergence of capitalists within a subsistent agrarian society can disrupt social relations between them (Scott 1994). If a richer figure emerges within the peasants’ society, the peasants will face additional pressure. The emergence of someone with stronger economic capacity among subsistent peasants creates vertical social relations with the new capitalist class besides the long-standing ruling class — thus, adding more pressure to the peasants. Rich people with their wealth would likely control the peasant’s subsistence life by acting as money-lenders or brokers. To avoid the presence of local capitalists, Javanese society created a unique social construction ​to give negative stereotypes to the rich — in the form of beliefs and rumours regarding ghosts and spirits who help a person to become rich in an undignified way (Reinhart 2019). Reflecting from the above explanation, Chinese presence within the Javanese peasant community was unacceptable because they act like capitalists but cannot be controlled through the Javanese social construction. Today, the old social construction ​​fades, but stereotypes against the Chinese people are still remembered without a clear basis. At this point, the understanding of the right historical facts [on why Chinese people was initially hated] becomes very important. Today, the Indonesians are no longer an agrarian society. Besides that, the Chinese people now do not enjoy the special position as the only capitalist group like in the colonial era. Both variables have changed and assimilated.

The growth of negative stereotypes towards Chinese in Indonesia became increasingly complex during the colonial period. Dutch colonial race-based stratification reinforced the negative view against the Chinese. For decades, the privileged position of the Chinese in colonial social structure was used as a basis to explain the people’s hatred to the ethnic group. In the colonial scheme, Europeans occupied the position of first-class citizens, oriental groups including Chinese occupied the second-class, and natives occupied the lowest class (Vlekke 2016). Such policies did not emerge groundlessly. One of the factors that contributed to the formation of such stratification was the Chinese prominence in the economy. However, there was a more strategic and diplomatic reason for this arrangement. Oriental communities — the Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and other Asians — were considered as the citizens of their home country. From this point of view, the Dutch colonial government considered that the Chinese in the Indonesian islands was protected by the Qing Dynasty because of their citizenship. The colonial government (after 1818) cannot act arbitrarily against these people. If we put it in the present context, the position of oriental communities in the colonial era can be compared to foreign tourists or workers. The colonial government could not treat them as they pleased because they might face the Chinese imperial government — or other Asian states’ government. Even so, the power of the home country was also dynamic and did not always so significant in protecting its citizens abroad.

In the Chinese case, for example, the policies of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) did not always provide full protection to the overseas Chinese and Chinese overseas. The Qing Dynasty once imposed a travel ban to the southern region (nán yáng) — now we call it as Southeast Asia — and renounced all protections and connections with the Chinese people in the region. Moreover, during the century of humiliation (1839–1949), the government no longer had the power to protect its citizens abroad. In his unpublished research paper, historian Gregor Benton implied that in the late nineteenth century to the fall of the Dutch East Indies (DEI) in 1942, the colonial government and plantation owners treated the Chinese workers in the DEI very badly. The lives of some of them as indentured labours were even worse than ordinary natives. By looking at this fact, we found that the hatred towards the Chinese community due to their privileged position during the colonial period is irrelevant and baseless. Every ethnic community has been treated as poorly during the lifetime of the colonial government. The negative stereotypes against the Chinese in Indonesia will continue to grow if the general public does not have access to the right historical knowledge.

Today, there is one more problem that arises due to our historical misunderstanding. This month [January 2020] was opened with tensions arose from Indonesia–China border conflict regarding the South China Sea (CNN Indonesia Jan 6, 2020). The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) based their claim on the historical record of Nine-dash Lines. Meanwhile, Indonesia based its territorial standpoint on the Juanda’s maritime declaration (1957) and the DEI’s colonial territory. At this point, there are two different historical standpoints. Indonesia in 1945 proclaimed its independence from all foreign powers. The territory which was claimed to be independent was the territory of the old DEI — which was occupied by Japan in the Second World War. Thus, the newly born Indonesia was an independent version of the DEI. The territory that was proclaimed to be independent is the territory that was once the possessions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Asia. The nationalists did not set independence based on the territory of Majapahit (1293–c. 1517) or Srivijaya (c. 650–c. 1377). Therefore, we did not include the Malay Peninsula and the southern part of the Philippines in the territory we declared independent in 1945. This basis is very different from the PRC.

The Chinese national revolution under Sun Yat-Sen (1866–1925) in the early twentieth century was a revolution to create a new order, not solely to free themselves from foreign powers. The revolution was not mainly aimed to overthrow the foreign government, but instead to change the political order from monarchy to the republic (Wasserstrom 2016). This happened because China did not experience a single-colonialism like what happened in most Southeast Asian countries. China lost much of its territories to the European powers in the form of concessions. By this, the Qing Dynasty was not entirely under the control of other countries. Instead, many strategic Chinese port-cities were controlled by the European powers and this situation made China a victim of hypocolonialism (see below). This indeed resulted in a huge dissatisfaction that soon manifested as one of the revolution factors. Therefore, when the Republic of China and then the PRC was established, the territory claimed by them was the traditional territory of the Qing Dynasty, not the territory of a modern colonial state.

If we pay close attention to the history of eastern Asia (both the south and north), we will find that the concept of territory in this region was unique. This region did not recognize exclusive sea, but instead a free sea with freedom of activity in it (Reid 2011). With this scheme, the maritime activities of a country could reach a very wide area. Traditional fisheries of Nusantara, for example, reached north Australia and the Philippines. It is possible that this concept was building the Nine-dash Lines area that China claims as its traditional fishing ground. At this point, we might want to also base our territorial claim on our traditional entities (Majapahit and Srivijaya). The problem facing Indonesia, in this case, is the basis of our independence. Indonesia did not claim independence based on traditional territory, whereas China constructed their independence on the foundation of a traditional entity.

The basic difference above is now causing two different points of view. Indonesia, which had experienced colonialism, based its independence and state-formation on the experience of colonialism. Meanwhile, China which had never experienced a single-colonialism based its independence on the traditional entities of the old dynasties with a new political form. Knowledge of these basic differences and experiences should be one of the considerations of diplomats who want to resolve the conflicts in the South China Sea. We need to emphasize the way we see our territorial problems and the differences with China.

The growing hatred and blind prejudice formed by the general public against China is a result of their failure to understand history. Through this essay, we can see that at least three basic blind hatreds can be destroyed through an understanding of history. The capitalist stereotypes against the Chinese in Java from the premodern era; the idea that the Chinese in Indonesia obtained privileges during the colonial period; and the hatred towards PRC that issued territorial claims in the present are the three baseless hatred due to the misunderstanding or the lack of understanding of history. By understanding history, we will understand the force that drives a certain historical actor to do something. We will understand the motivations and pressures that must be considered. By this understanding, a person will not be driven by groundless hatred. To celebrate seventy years of our [Indonesia–China] bilateral relations, I invite the general public to understand history correctly and not to give groundless stereotypes. Moreover, I also invite the people and governments of the two countries to understand more about each other’s history. By understanding our history correctly, there will be no room for groundless hatred and stereotype.

Hypocolonialism

Hypocolonialism is a Chinese historical concept referring to the country’s condition during the late 19th century. It showed the growth of capitalism amid the feudal environment. Capitalism grew from the European-controlled port-cities while the feudalism remained unchanging in the imperial territories.

References

“Kapal China Bertahan di Natuna, TNI Kirim 8 KRI Berpatroli”. CNN Indonesia, Jan 6. Jakarta: CNN Indonesia.

Lembaga Survei Indonesia. 2020. Persepsi Publik Terhadap Negara-negara Paling Berpengaruh di Asia. Jakarta: LSI.

Onghokham. 2008. Anti Cina, Kapitalisme Cina, dan Gerakan Cina: Sejarah Etnis Cina di Indonesia. Depok: Komunitas Bambu.

Reid, Anthony. 2011. Asia Tenggara dalam Kurun Niaga Jilid 2: Jaringan Perdagangan Global. Jakarta: Obor.

Reinhart, Christopher. 2019. “Kapitalisme dan Lelembut: Sisi Lain Alam Pikir Ekonomi Jawa (The Capitalism and the Javanese Ghosts: The Other Side of the Javanese Economical Thoughts)”. Unpublished Research Paper.

Scott, James C. 1944. Moral Ekonomi Petani: Pergolakan dan Subsistensi di Asia Tenggara. Jakarta: LP3ES.

Vlekke, Bernard H. M. 2016. Nusantara: Sejarah Indonesia. Jakarta: KPG.

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. 2016. The Oxford Illustrated History of Modern China. London: Oxford UP.

*) This essay was previously presented to the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia and the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China to Indonesia in January 2020. Several changes were made from the original text.

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Christopher Reinhart

Writing about my thoughts, usually reflecting from history. Research Consultant at Nanyang Technological University.